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Abstract 
The XMX/2L-MIL is a high volume air sampler used by the Air Force 
Bioenvironmental Engineering community to collect biological aerosols.  Without a 
verified decontamination technique, however, the XMX cannot be used effectively.  The 
objective of this study was to evaluate several proposed methods for expedient field 
decontamination of the XMX.  This study centered on the inactivation of Bacillus 
atrophaeus spores and vegetative Erwinia herbicola organisms from the XMX inner 
canister.  The goals in this investigation were twofold: 1) to verify the antimicrobial 
efficacy of a 10% bleach solution and 2) to determine if wiping the components with a 
bleach-soaked paper towel or submerging the components directly in the bleach solution 
represents the optimal decontamination procedure.   
Data was gathered at the Dycor Technologies facility located in Edmonton, 
Alberta, Canada.  Their Aerosol Test Chamber was used to disseminate the surrogate 
agents and then sample the aerosol using three XMX devices.  Counts of the microbial 
population were calculated at each stage of the procedure to assess the efficacy of the two 
proposed methods. 
It was observed that 10% bleach solutions resulted in approximately 102-fold 
decreases in aggregate microbial contamination on XMX components.  Of the methods 
tested, the submersion in a 10% bleach solution plus a 15-minute air purge showed the 
most efficiency.  Contamination levels were consistent between all three devices during 
the trial and were measured at or below background levels after decontamination. 
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ANALYSIS OF EXPEDIENT FIELD DECONTAMINATION METHODS FOR THE 
XMX/2L-MIL HIGH-VOLUME AEROSOL SAMPLER 
I. Introduction 
Background 
Biological warfare, in one form or another, has existed nearly as long as 
conventional warfare itself.  Though earlier peoples lacked an understanding of why 
these weapons were so deadly, they quickly realized how to harness them to their 
advantage.  Contaminating water supplies with animal remains and excrement 
represented rudimentary attempts at conducting biological warfare (Martin, Christopher, 
& Eitzen, 2007).  One of the most salient examples of primitive biological warfare was 
the siege of Caffa.  A port city in what is modern Ukraine; it was besieged by the 
Mongols in 1345.  After a year of battle, an outbreak of plague struck the invading 
Mongols.  Gabriele de Mussi, an Italian notary who chronicled the siege, described 
“thousands upon thousands” of Mongols killed every day due to the ravages of plague 
(Wheelis, 2002).  Though eventually forced to retreat, the Mongols sensed an opportunity 
to inflict revenge upon the Genoese holed up in Caffa and “ordered corpses to be placed 
in catapults and lobbed into the city in the hope that the intolerable stench would kill 
everyone inside (Wheelis, 2002).”  Though the germ theory of infection was still 
centuries away, mankind’s understanding of disease was still sufficient to realize that it 
was yet another weapon to add to his arsenal. 
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As microbiology advanced, so too did biological warfare.  Robert Koch’s famous 
four postulates on the relationship between microbial life and disease causation made it 
possible to grow pure stocks of bacteria, including pathogens suited for biological attacks 
(Christopher, Cieslak, Pavlin, & Eitzen, 1997).  Germany was the first state to adopt a 
scientifically rigorous biological warfare program geared toward offense.  In the early 
1930’s Japan founded Unit 731 and by the end of World War II it was capable of 
producing thousands of pounds of anthrax per year (Alibek, Lobanova, & Popov, 2005).  
The United States maintained an offensive biological weapons program for almost 30 
years and weaponized many lethal agents such as Francisella tularensis and botulinum 
toxin as well as incapacitating agents such as Brucella suis and Staphylococcal 
enterotoxin B (Christopher, Cieslak, Pavlin, & Eitzen, 1997).  The program was 
terminated by President Richard Nixon in 1969 and the stockpiled agents were destroyed 
from 1971-1972. 
All of the above programs were eclipsed by that of the U.S.S.R. which maintained 
one of the world’s most infamous state-run biological weapons programs, devoting far 
more time and resources than many other countries.  Tularemia was rumored to have 
been used on the Eastern front against the Germans during the Second World War, after 
an unexplained outbreak affected a disproportionate number of German soldiers despite 
the relative proximity of the two armies (Alibek, 1999).  However, the roots of the Soviet 
program go back as far as 1928.  Following the revolution, the Bolsheviks realized that 
disease, not bullets and bayonets, was responsible for the vast majority of casualties 
during the fighting.  This revelation prompted the Revolutionary Military Council to 
order the development of a typhus weapon, the first arrow in the Soviet’s biological 
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quiver.  From those humble beginnings eventually evolved Biopreparat, the civilian cover 
for the main directorate of biological weapons research.  Ironically, the biggest strides in 
their research occurred under the command of Gen. Yuri Kalinin, years after the U.S.S.R. 
had become a signatory to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Alibek, 1999).  
It was Russian President Boris Yeltsin, in 1992, who finally made biological weapons 
illegal.   
It is a common assertion that biological weapons represent a growing threat to the 
United States.  The so-called “Amerithrax” incident, documents on bioterrorism 
recovered from al-Qaeda camps, makeshift ricin laboratories discovered in Chechnya and 
the attempted theft of pathogens from culture collections in Indonesia all indicate that the 
intention to use biological weapons still remains (Committee on Prevention of 
Proliferation of Biological Weapons, 2007).  It also implies the biological threat is largely 
no longer from massive, state-sponsored programs like those of the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU) but smaller, more nebulous groups.  When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1992, 
Biopreparat and its subordinate institutions had tens of thousands of weapons specialists 
in their service.  It was believed these scientists could provide biological weapons 
capability to rogue nations or terrorist groups.  Iran was accused of trying to recruit a 
Russian scientist to make biological weapons for them in late 1998 (Loeb, 2009).  This 
belief was the genesis of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which aimed to 
stem all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation in the FSU.  To counter the 
specific biological threat, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency implements the 
Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) which aims to prevent the proliferation of 
expertise, materials, equipment and technology leading to biological weapons. The BTRP 
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does so by employing these former weapons scientists in mutually beneficial biological 
research (Committee on Prevention of Proliferation of Biological Weapons, 2007).   
Some professionals, however, remain extremely skeptical of the notion that 
biological terrorism poses as serious a threat as some of the evidence might suggest.  
William R. Clark, professor emeritus of immunology at UCLA, believes the threat of 
biological terrorism is largely embellished and the billions spent under Project Bioshield 
have been unnecessary.  Professor Clark takes issue with the underlying assumptions that 
many studies utilize when predicting the sometimes cataclysmic results of a biological 
attack (Palmquist, 2008).  A brief examination of actual biological attacks in the last 20 
years seems to support this stance.  Doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo attempted to use 
aerosolized anthrax spores against Kameido, Tokyo, Japan in 1993 (Takahashi, 2004).  
During the final week of June that year, citizens began reporting foul odors, loud noises 
and intermittent mists coming from the Aum Shinrikyo headquarters building.  Some 
individuals fell ill with flu-like symptoms but recovered quickly.  Eventually, the 
complaints forced Aum’s leader, Shoko Asahara, to stop the endeavor.  It was only after 
the 1995 sarin gas attack was this event recognized as a failed biological attack.  Asahara 
eventually admitted the mists were crude aerosolized suspensions of Bacillus anthracis 
spores.  Despite having multiple doctors and nurses in the cult’s employ and commanding 
a surprising amount of wealth (one cult leader estimated Aum Shinrikyo’s net worth at 
over a billion dollars), producing an anthrax weapon capable of inflicting even a single 
casualty proved too insurmountable an obstacle (Olson, 1999).  Similarly, the anthrax 
mail attacks in 2001 resulted in only 22 infections and 5 fatalities.  These incidents 
illustrate that considerable time and effort must be invested to make a viable biological 
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weapon, even from an ideal agent like Bacillus anthracis.  So is the collective worry 
about potential biological threats justified?   
Examining a page from the history of the Soviet biological weapons program 
might provide a better indication of the deadly potential biological weapons possess.  Just 
outside of the city of Sverdlovsk was Compound 19, a clandestine facility tasked with 
producing large quantities of anthrax spores for the Soviet arsenal.  Within the 
compound, fermented spores were dried and ground into a fine power for use as an 
aerosol weapon (Alibek, 1999).  As a consequence of this process, the building’s interior 
was filled with spores and only a series of exhaust vent filters prevented their escape into 
the nearby city.  Sometime during the course of operations one of the filters became 
clogged and was removed from the exhaust pipe. When the next shift began, the officer-
in-charge was unaware of the missing filter and ordered anthrax production to be 
resumed.  As a result, aerosolized anthrax spores were ejected into the night air and 
toward the unsuspecting town.  Within days workers at a nearby ceramics factory began 
to fall ill and within one week most had died (Alibek, 1999).  The communist party 
quickly shifted the blame to contaminated meat, a somewhat plausible explanation as the 
anthrax bacillus can indeed infect people through the gastrointestinal tract.  
Fifteen years later and after careful epidemiological review by Matthew Meselson 
it was discovered that Compound 19 was indeed the cause of the anthrax outbreak.  The 
case of Sverdlovsk illustrates how potentially devastating a concerted attack with 
aerosolized anthrax could be.  The release killed at least 66 Soviet citizens and dozens 
more were infected.  While 60 deaths are not by any standard “mass destruction,” it can 
be considered a sort of proof of concept for an actual biological attack.  The release 
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demonstrated that a bacterial aerosol represents a significant hazard, long before the 
anthrax attacks of 2001 in the United States. Had the soviets planned an actual attack 
with their anthrax weapon from Sverdlovsk, a number of factors would likely have been 
different.  Planners would have accounted for meteorological conditions, times when the 
most people would be in the area or used more complicated dispersal methods, all of 
which would have assuredly raised the death toll several-fold.  The vaccination campaign 
conducted soon after may have mitigated the effects, but with a surreptitious attack on an 
unsuspecting and immunologically naïve population much higher casualties would be 
expected (Meselson, et al., 1994). 
In the report from the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, the authors assert that biological terrorism 
represents a greater threat than nuclear terrorism, due in part to the widespread 
proliferation of advanced biotechnologies like genetic engineering and genome synthesis 
(Graham, et al., 2008).  Despite the successes of the BTRP in the states of the FSU there 
is still significant risk from many other locations including South Asia, Africa, Latin 
American and the Middle East (Committee on Prevention of Proliferation of Biological 
Weapons, 2007).  Presumably, such dual-use technologies could be used to increase a 
microorganism’s virulence or alter its genome to render current vaccines ineffective.  
Furthermore, increasingly smaller and more efficient equipment, like bioreactors, may 
reduce signatures of a developing biological weapons capability (U.S. Congress, Office 
of Technology Assessment, 1993).  Others assert that such weapons are easier to conceal 
from the international community, cheaper to produce and have the potential to inflict far 
greater casualties (Zubay, 2005).  This is not merely speculation as evidence exists that 
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enemies of the United States actively intend to use such weapons, though their capability 
to do so remains limited.  In 2005 a primer on biological weapons was posted on the Iraqi 
al-Qaeda website, in which the author states: 
Biological weapons are considered the least complicated and the easiest to 
manufacture [of] all weapons of mass destruction.  All the information concerning 
the production of these weapons is readily available in academic books, scholarly 
publications and even on the internet….In addition to the ease of production, 
these weapons are also considered to be the most affordable.  With $50,000 a 
group of amateurs can possess a biological weapon sufficient to threaten a 
superpower.  It is for this reason that biological weapons are called the poor 
man’s atomic weapon (Slama & Bursac, 2009). 
 
This growing concern is especially evident in national guidance documents.  The 
National Security Strategy of 2002 lists among its aims the prevention of the United 
States’ enemies from acquiring WMD.  The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction identifies three pillars in America’s attempt to protect itself: 
counterproliferation, nonproliferation and consequence management.  The National 
Military Strategy to Combat WMD (NMS-CWMD) takes these three pillars and “creates 
a strategic framework for combating WMD.” 
In support of the NMS-CWMD, the Air Force authored Doctrine Document 2-1.8 
Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations (C-CBRN).  AFDD 
2-1.8 charges Air Force commanders and personnel with the responsibility to prevent an 
attack with CBRN weapons and to mitigate their effects if one is used (Air Force 
Doctrine Center, 2007).  The Air Force has five operational pillars of C-CBRN 
operations which are: proliferation prevention, counterforce, active defense, passive 
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defense, and consequence management.  This paper will focus on certain aspects of the 
passive defense pillar. 
Should an adversary of the United States succeed in evading active defense 
measures and successfully launch a CBRN attack, passive defense allows commanders to 
neutralize, contain and manage its effects on an Air Force installation and its 
surroundings.  There are many passive defense measures; the two of particular interest to 
this project are 1) detection and identification and 2) decontamination.   
 There is no unified career field within the Air Force which handles the planning, 
preparation and response to CBRN incidents.  Instead, two separate AFSCs provide this 
capability: the civil engineering emergency managers and the bioenvironmental 
engineers.  The bioenvironmental engineering (BEE) mission involves conducting health 
risk assessments which identify, evaluate and control hazards (including CBRN hazards) 
and then communicating the findings to commanders which contributes to informed 
decision-making. 
 Should the need arise to respond to a CBRN event, the BEE community has 
significant capability for each component of CBRN.  To assist in the response to a 
biological incident, the Air Force has purchased the XMX/2L-MIL from Dycor 
Technologies Ltd.  The XMX is a high-volume bioaerosol collector designed for 
operations in harsh environments.  It is capable of collecting large volumes of air, 
removing undesirable particles (e.g. dust and debris) and concentrating aerosolized 
particles between 1 and 10 micrometers (i.e. respirable particles) into a 50 ml centrifuge 
tube, which may be used in conjunction with additional techniques such as polymerase 
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chain reaction (PCR) or enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) to identify the 
pathogen and enact appropriate response measures (Dycor, 2007).   
 The XMX was part of a two-phase test of the Chemical Biological Aerosol 
Warning System (CBAWS) conducted at Camp As-Sayliyah, Qatar in July 2003 and 
Eglin AFB, FL from October to November 2003.  CBAWS is a network of biological 
detection, collection and identification devices designed to provide commanders with 
detect-to-warn and detect-to-treat capabilities (AFIOH, 2006).  Testing focused on 
assessing system performance in environments resembling expeditionary conditions (hot, 
dry and windy) and in mild, humid environments with little prevailing wind. 
Only during the Eglin trials were simulated biological agents released.  There 
were 21 BW “attacks” dispersed in both point and line fashions.  When the Biological 
Aerosol Warning Sensor (BAWS) Mk. III detected biological particles in the air, the 
XMX would be remotely triggered to begin sampling.  The collected material would then 
be analyzed by the Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification Device (RAPID) 
system.  Fifteen of the samples gathered from the XMX were tested of which 7 proved 
positive.  Of the 8 negatives, only one was from a sample registered by the referee tower, 
while the others were not hit and one contained a toxin simulant undetectable using 
RAPID. 
Subsequently, ten aerosol samples were selected for identification using handheld 
assays (HHA).  Of the ten, five were confirmed positive and the remaining five were 
from samples where the referee towers registered no agent cloud.  Overall, it was 
ascertained that samples collected by the XMX work well in conjunction with the Air 
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Force’s methods of BW identification, as demonstrated by the 100% success rate when 
using the HHA.   
Problem Statement 
Use of the XMX air sampler has been hindered by lack of a verified 
decontamination procedure.  Without the knowledge of what decontamination techniques 
are effective, the Air Force runs the risk of cross-contaminating collected samples, 
leading to false positive results and potentially wasting time and resources on nonexistent 
threats.   
Research Objectives/Questions/Hypotheses 
The objective of this study is to evaluate proposed methods for expedient field 
decontamination of the XMX.   
Research Focus 
This study centers on the decontamination of Bacillus atrophaeus spores and 
vegetative Erwinia herbicola organisms from five specific XMX components. 
Investigative Questions 
This investigation has two principal goals: 1) to verify that a 10% bleach solution 
is an effective decontaminant for use with the XMX and 2) to determine if wiping the 
components with a bleach-soaked towel or submerging the components directly in the 
bleach solution represents the optimal decontamination procedure. 
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Assumptions/Limitations 
This study was limited to only spores of gram-positive organisms and vegetative 
gram-negative organisms.  This represents only a portion of the spectrum of potential 
biological threat agents which also include viruses, rickettsiae or toxins. 
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the efficacy of potential decontamination 
agents for use on the XMX/2L-MIL.  Specific focus is given to sodium hypochlorite 
inactivation of bacteria, in both vegetative and spore form. 
Background 
Terms such as disinfectant or antiseptic are often used in common parlance 
without recognizing that strict, legal definitions exist.  A disinfectant is most often, but 
not necessarily, a chemical agent which destroys germs and inactivates viruses (Block, 
2001).  Usually it is understood to affect only vegetative organisms and not bacterial 
endospores.  Antisepsis is the inhibition or destruction of microbial growth on living 
tissue (Block, 2001).  Sterilization refers to any chemical or physical process which 
results in the eradication of microbial life-both vegetative bacteria and endospores 
(Block, 2001).  More generally, the term biocide may be applied to any chemical agent 
possessing disinfecting or sterilizing properties.  The definition of decontamination is 
more operational in nature and refers to removing microbial populations to make objects, 
or even people, suitable for further use.  A more military-oriented definition is the 
“reduction or removal of [biological] agents so they are no longer hazards (Hurst, 1997).” 
Biological warfare agents encompass a wide variety of organisms with different 
morphological and physiological characteristics.  Of the six agents on the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Category A agent list, two are gram-negative 
organisms, one is a spore-forming organism, one is a protein toxin and the remaining two 
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are viruses (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2008).  Each of these agents 
possesses various mechanisms of resistance to chemical agents.  Two significant means 
of natural resistance include enzymatic inactivation of the antimicrobial agents and 
permeability barriers, which may be present in the form of a spore coat or the gram-
negative cell wall.  The chart in Figure 1 shows the relative resistance of various 
microorganisms to decontaminating agents with the most resistant at the top.  
Biocides themselves differ in various properties, including on which cellular 
constituents they exert their lethal activity, and whether or not they can inactivate spores.  
Phenolic and quaternary ammonium compounds exhibit broad antimicrobial activity, but 
fail to eliminate spores (Russell A. , 1991).  The ability to sterilize a surface is especially 
important for applications in biological terrorism/warfare, as the most-discussed threat, 
anthrax, would most likely be disseminated in spore form.  Glutaraldehyde, 
formaldehyde, peroxygen compounds and hypochlorites have all demonstrated sporocidal 
effects (Russell A. , 1991). 
Multiple factors govern the interaction of microorganisms with biocides.  Two 
have already been listed (the microorganisms and the biocides themselves) but 
environmental factors such as pH, temperature and concentration as well as the contact 
time contribute to the interaction as well (Russell A. , 1991). 
If one were to list the attributes of an ideal decontaminant they might select 
criteria such as broad spectrum antimicrobial activity, ready availability, ease-of-use, 
nonharmful to humans/equipment at operational concentrations, chemical stability, and 
rapid action.  Hypochlorite compounds satisfy many of the above criteria and are the 
disinfectants of interest in this investigation. 
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Figure 1. Relative resistance of various microorganisms to disinfectants from most resistant to least 
resistant. 
 
 
History of Chlorine Disinfection 
Chlorination has a long history as an antiseptic, a disinfectant and a sterilant.  
After the discovery of chlorine in 1774 by Karl Wilhelm Scheele, it soon found many 
applications in the fields of sanitation and medicine.  By 1825, calcium hypochlorite was 
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being used in the general sanitation of everything from morgues to sewers to prisons.  
Oliver Wendell Holmes discovered the relationship between puerperal fever when he 
observed that a physician who regularly washed his hands with calcium hypochlorite had 
far fewer fatalities among his patients.  To this day, chlorination is the most common 
method of disinfecting drinking water (Rose, et al., 2005).  Inorganic hypochlorite finds 
extensive use in hospitals as well (Rutala & Weber, 1997).  Of the many types of 
chlorine-releasing agents (CRA), hypochlorites are the most prominent in disinfection 
(Dychdala, 1991).   
Mechanisms of Chlorine Disinfection on Vegetative Bacteria 
Upon the introduction of elemental chlorine into aqueous solution, the following 
reaction occurs: 2 2Cl H O HOCl H Cl
+ −+ → + +  (Dychdala, 1991).  Free chlorine forms 
hypochlorous acid (HOCl) along with hydrogen and chloride ions.  Salts of hypochlorous 
acid are referred to as hypochlorites, which will dissociate to form a hydroxide and 
hypochlorous acid in aqueous solutions (Dychdala, 1991). 
2
2 2
2 2 2
( ) 2
( ) 2 ( ) 2
Ca OCl Ca H O OCl
Ca OCl H O Ca OH HOCl
+ −→ + +
+ → +  
Equilibrium exists between hypochlorous acid and hypochlorite ion (OCl-), 
HOCl H OCl+ −+€ with hypochlorous acid as the moiety responsible for bacterial 
inactivation (Brazis, Leslie, Kabler, & Woodward, 1958).  It is a highly-destructive, 
broad-spectrum oxidizing agent, capable of reacting with numerous biological 
macromolecules and other cellular components (McKenna & Davies, 1988).  These 
include nucleotides, enzymes, cell membranes, electron transport chains and 
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active/structural proteins.  McKenna and Davies report a study by Albrecht et al. which 
describes a specific attack by hypochlorous acid on the bacterial cell envelope (1988).  It 
is also suggested that DNA damage or the inhibition of DNA replication may represent 
another inactivation mechanism.  At pH levels below neutral, hypochlorous acid remains 
in its un-ionized form and at alkaline pH exists as hypochlorite ion.  This fact is 
especially important to decontamination efforts as the relative sporocidal efficacy of 
hypochlorous acid compared to hypochlorite ion has been estimated at nearly 100:1 
(Brazis, Leslie, Kabler, & Woodward, 1958). 
The plasma membranes of gram-positive and gram-negative organisms are likely 
targets for CRAs.  As mentioned previously, there are several subcellular targets that an 
antimicrobial agent may act on; most of which require transport through the plasma 
membrane.  Studying the light-scattering properties of E. coli colonies demonstrated that 
after exposure to 50 µM HOCl, absorbance did not decrease, indicating the bacteria were 
inactivated without suffering significant insult to the phospholipids and proteins in their 
cell membranes (McKenna & Davies, 1988).  Only after exposure to 10mM HOCl did 
significant membrane disruption occur, this being several times higher than the normal 
lethal concentration. 
When exposed to chlorine in distilled water both gram-positive and gram-negative 
bacteria showed increased permeability in their plasma membranes (Virto, Manas, 
Alvarez, Condon, & Raso, 2005).  The concentration of chlorine, however, which causes 
this permability was several times higher than what is required to kill the cells, again 
suggesting that membrane damage is not a significant factor in the inactivation of 
vegetative bacteria (Virto, Manas, Alvarez, Condon, & Raso, 2005).  
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When grown in the presence of 3H-tagged thymidine, the uptake into a replicating 
DNA molecule was significantly inhibited by exposure to 50µM HOCl.  This inhibition 
indicates a defect within the bacterium’s DNA replication machinery.  Within one 
minute, uptake of the radioactive nucleoside had decreased by 48% and by 5 minutes it 
had decreased by another 48% (McKenna & Davies, 1988).  Furthermore, gram-negative 
bacteria who lack the gene recA/recB, proteins crucial for post-germination DNA repair, 
are much more sensitive to challenges with hypochlorous acid (Dukan & Touati, 1996). 
Without successful DNA replication, cells cannot complete their division, making the 
inhibition of DNA synthesis a good indicator of cytotoxic effects. 
Similar effects are observed in the incorporation of 3H-tagged leucine into 
bacterial proteins, which suggests than in addition to DNA proteins are another target of 
hypochlorite (McKenna & Davies, 1988).  Low molar concentrations of HOCl act on 
proteins by causing oxidative unfolding in vitro.  In vivo, however, it exerts its effect on 
proteins by encouraging irreversible aggregation (Winter, Ilbert, Graf, Özcelik, & Jakob, 
2008).  Heat-shock protein (Hsp) 33 is a bacterial protein activated by heat stress, which 
in turn prevents other proteins from aggregating and losing function.  Strains of E.coli 
and V. cholerae defecient for Hsp33 showed increased sensitivity to hypochlorous acid 
exposure. 
In light of the 2001 anthrax attacks, the CDC studied how well the chlorine levels 
maintained in public drinking water systems would protect the population if potential 
biological weapon agents were introduced.  Strains of Yersinia pestis, Brucella and 
Burkholderia are all very sensitive to the free avialable chlorine (FAC) in potable water, 
with the majority of the inoculum being inactivated within 10 minutes.  Francisella 
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tularensis is a somewhat hardier organism against low chlorine concentrations.  When 
tested against Bacillus spores (one virulent and one attenuated), hours of exposure were 
required before any significant reduction took place (Rose, et al., 2005).  Median FAC 
concentrations were calculated as well as median contact times (1.1mg/liter and 45 min 
respectively) and based on study findings this would be sufficient to inactivate 
Burkholderia mallei, B. pseudomallei, Brucella melitensis, B. suis, Francisella tularensis 
and Yersinia pestis by more than 3-logs under similar conditions (Rose, et al., 2005). 
Spore Structure/Resistance 
Before discussing how a bacterial spore may be inactivated, it would be 
appropriate to discuss what features in particular make spores resistant to so many forms 
of disinfection, especially chemical agents.  The general anatomy of a spore consists of 
several proteinacious structures arranged in concentric layers around a central core 
containing the DNA and essential enzymes.  The layers are (from exterior to interior): 
exosporium, spore coats, outer membrane, cortex, germ cell wall and inner membrane 
(Setlow, 2006).  The exosporium is where the spore intereacts with its environment.  Its 
surface is studded with antigens and acts as a semipermeable membrane to exclude 
harmful chemicals.  Not all spore-forming bacteria possess an exosporium, for example 
Bacillus subtilis either lacks an exosporium entirely or it is very difficult to detect.  It is 
made of two proteins layers: a paracrystalline basal layer and an external layer 
resembling a “hair-like fringe” formed by filaments of BclA, a glycoprotein (Setlow, 
2006).  Three enzymes are present within the basal layer, alanine racemerase, isosine-
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uridine-preferring nuceloside hydrolase and superoxide dismutase.  The latter may serve 
a protective role by ridding the spore of reactive oxygen compounds. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Generalized depiction of a Bacillus spore. 
 
 
Beneath the exosporium sits the spore coat, an intricate structure constructed from 
over 50 proteins.  It is a major component of spore resistance especially against oxidizing 
agents such as chlorine dioxide, hypochlorite and ozone (Setlow, 2006).  This resistance 
is one of the factors which makes Bacillus anthracis an ideal biological weapon agent 
(Ghosh, et al., 2008).  The morphogenesis of the spore coat is a complex process, but 
there are several proteins that play a significant role.  SpoIVA designates the surface of 
the newly-forming spore as the site for all future protein deposition (Giorno, et al., 2007) 
(Driks, 2002).  The protein shell which forms around SpoIVA is referred to as the 
precoat.  The outermost layer of the precoat contains another imporant protein, CotE.  
Inner coat proteins are deposited between the layers of CotE and SpoIVA.  CotE is 
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crucial for the formation of the outer coat and responsible for directing at least 8 
structural proteins to their proper locations (Driks, 2002).  SpoIVA has several fucntions 
in addition to protein deposition; it is required for the formation of the cortex and germ 
cell wall as well as for attaching the coat to the developing spore (Driks, 2002) (Giorno, 
et al., 2007).  In the same way, CotE is responsible for the assembly of the exosporium 
which is fragmented or entirely absent in CotE-deficient strains of Bacillus anthracis 
(Giorno, et al., 2007).  This fact may have limited consequences for biological weapons 
development as removal of the exosporium from the Ames strain did not result in the loss 
of virulence (Giorno, et al., 2007).  Lastly, Cotα is another important component of the 
spore’s outer coat.  It can be visualized through thin section electron microscopy as a 
dark-staining region in the outer coat.  With six cysteine residues, extensive intra- and 
intermolecular disulfide bridges form, potentially contributing to the resistance properties 
of the coat (Kim, Sherman, Johnson, & Aronson, 2004) 
The outer membrane is an essential factor in spore growth, but may not be a 
significant permeability barrier to harmful molecules.  The cortex is composed of a 
specialized form of peptidoglycan (PG), the chemical responsible for maintaining 
bacterial shape and counteracting osmotic pressure in bacterial cell walls (Driks, 2002). It 
has a low water content and is degraded during spore germination.  Similarly, the germ 
cell wall is also composed of peptidoglycan, yet it more closely resembles the cell walls 
of vegetative organisms (Setlow, 2006).   
The inner spore membrane functions as a low-permeability barrier, further 
blocking small hydrophilic and hydrophobic chemicals which could damage critical cell 
components  (Setlow, 2006).  Even small, uncharged molecules like methlyamine cross 
 21 
the inner membrane extremely slowly (Setlow, 2006).  The reasons for the inner 
membrane’s lack of permeablity is unknown, but it may be due to the relative immobility 
of its lipid consituents (Setlow, 2006).   
The core contains DNA, tRNA and necessary enzymes for germination, all 
identical to those found in a vegetative organism (Setlow, 2006).  Three molecules (in the 
spore’s core) play an important role in the resistance of the spore: H2O is present in much 
lower concentrations than in vegetative bacterial cells which restricts the movement of 
macromolecules.  The second is dipicolonic acid. Synthesized by the mother cell it is 
subsequently absorbed into the spore. The last type of molecule is small acid-soluble 
proteins (SASP) (alpha and beta) which are assembled within the forespore before being 
absorbed by the mother cell.  The SASP saturate the DNA, altering its structure and 
physical properties which contributes to its resistance to heat/chemicals. 
Mechanisms of Spore Killing by Hypochlorite 
 One of the most useful properties of hypochlorite compounds in the context of 
biological warfare and bioterrorism is that they are sporocidal at many concentrations.  
One suggested mechanism for this activity is that hypochlorite forces the separation of 
the spore coat from the cortex which is soon followed by cell lysis (McDonnell & 
Russell, 1999).  
Spores with defective or missing spore coats exhibit markedly increased 
sensitivity to hypochlorite disinfection. Spores with a mutation in the cotE gene (causing 
them to have a defective outer coat) exhibit a greater than 2-log reduction in less than 60 
seconds exposure to 50 ml l-1 sodium hypochlorite (Young & Setlow, 2003).  Outcomes 
 22 
are similar when the spores have been decoated via sonication or some other physical 
technique.  Decoated spores α-/β- spores or α-/β- cotE spores exhibited similar killing 
curves, indicating  that a defective spore coat does not appear to make the core vulnerable 
to attack by hypochlorite. 
DNA was suggested earlier as one of the potential targets for hypochlorite based 
on studies on E. coli growth (McDonnell & Russell, 1999).  More recent data suggests 
that DNA damage does not appear to be a significant factor in the sporocidal activity of 
hypochlorite (Young & Setlow, 2003).  Investigations comparing wild-type B. subtilis 
spores exposed to hypochlorite at pH 11 were similar to mutants which lacked  α/β SASP 
(each demonstrated about a 3-log reduction in 45 min) (Young & Setlow, 2003).  If the 
spore was also deficient for recA, the killing curve remained largely unchanged when 
compared to wild-type strains.  When spores were exposed to hypochlorite at neutral pH, 
the lethal effects occurred more rapidly, with a 3-log reduction within 8 minutes, nearly 
six times faster than at alkaline pH.  This is consistent with data from the inactivation of 
vegetative cells  (Young & Setlow, 2003).   
It has also been noted that hypochlorite-exposed spores tend to germinate very 
poorly (Wyatt & Waites, 1975).  The precise mechanism remains unclear at the moment, 
as no hydrolysis of the cortex or release of chemicals from the core itself (such as 
dipicolinic acid) has been observed.  It is possible that hypochlorites may damage the 
inner membrane in some manner which interferes with the germination pathway. 
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Effects of pH and Concentration 
When compared to other chemical agents, such as peracetic acid, copper-
ascorbate, glutaraldehyde, hydrogen peroxide, phenol and formaldehyde, hypochlorite 
demonstrates superior sporocidal effects (Sagripanti & Bonifacino, 1996).  A 0.05% 
solution of hypochlorite showed maximal killing efficacy at a neutral pH, resulting in 
fewer than 0.01% of Bacillus subtilis subs. globigii surviving.  Formaldehde, phenol and 
hydrogen peroxide (10%) each inactivated fewer than 10% of the exposed spores.  It was 
reported that an alkaline pH would practically eliminate any sporocidal activity exhibited 
by hypochlorite (Sagripanti & Bonifacino, 1996).  As previously mentioned, alkaline pH 
levels shift the equilibrium from hypochlorous acid to hypochlorite ion, the latter of 
which is a far less efficient antimicrobial compound.  Even at alkaline pH levels, some 
evidence has been found to suggest some sporocidal activity remains.  A 5% sodium 
hypochlorite solution is able to disinfect contaminated materials including tile, fabric, 
plastic, metal and cloth within 30 minutes at both pH 7 and 12 (Kenar, 2009).  The 
sporocidal activity at an alkaline pH is likely due to the increased concentration of 
hypochlorite ion present in the solution.  At 0.5% sodium hypochlorite, all samples were 
free of bacterial growth at neutral pH, but growth was observed in samples such as paper 
and soil at a pH of 12.  At 0.05%, both neutral and alkaline pH levels showed some 
growth on various environmental samples (Kenar, 2009). 
Effects of Different Solid Surfaces 
Comparisons of the relative binding strength of spores to various materials have 
suggested that little differences existed between spores bound to rubber or metal carriers 
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(Sagripanti, Carrera, Insalaco, Ziemski, Rogers, & Zandomeni, 2006).  Sporocidal assays 
comparing hypochlorite disinfection on rubber and metal coupons inoculated with B. 
anthracis, including the virulent Ames strain and several related Bacillus organisms, 
showed minimal variation in log10 reductions between the two materials (Sagripanti, 
Carrera, Insalaco, Ziemski, Rogers, & Zandomeni, 2006). 
Decontamination of Other Military Biological Detection Devices 
 Joint Portal Shield (JPS) was the Defense Department’s first automated, 
networked biological detection system. It was designed to provide security for high-
value, fixed-location assets and can presumptively identify up to 8 separate BWA 
through an internal Handheld Assay (HHA).  It utilizes the BAWS to determine the 
presence of airborne biological hazards.  Though there are no documented studies 
regarding the decontamination strategies for the JPS, the Operator’s Manual recommends 
using a 5% hypochlorite solution to sterilize the particle pre-separator, but not other 
components such as the cyclone and the sampler stack (Hamel, 2009). 
The Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS) is designed to replace 
“current force” detection systems such as the Joint Portal Shield, the Biological 
Integrated Detection System and the Interim Biological Agent Detector (Department of 
Defense, 2006).   Like the JPS, it is modular in nature and affords all four services 
automatic collection, detection, identification and warning capabilities on the battlefield 
(Kauchak, 2006).  Two studies were undertaken to investigate decontamination strategies 
for the JBPDS. 
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The first investigation was conducted at the West Desert Test Center, Dugway 
Proving Grounds, Utah.  The goals of this initial study were twofold: 1) to determine if 
the JBPDS leaked and 2) to develop decontamination procedures for its line-replaceable 
units.  The JBPDS was placed in their Aerosol Simulant Exposure Chamber (ASEC) 
which was exposed to an aerosol of Bacillus globigii spores at 1000 agent containing 
particles per liter of air (ACPLA).  The JBPDS was allowed to operate for an entire cycle 
and then external power was cut to simulate operations in degraded conditions.  The line-
replaceable units were then subject to decontamination with a 5% sodium hypochlorite 
solution.  The efforts to decontaminate the fluidics transfer system, the automated 
handheld assay and the inlet stack compressor created aerosol hazards that were deemed 
unacceptable to personnel.  Due to these setbacks, the investigators shifted focus to the 
task of decontaminating the BAWS Mk. IV alone.  Six decontamination protocols were 
then set forward:  
1. Use of Hype-Wipe (0.94% - 5.25% sodium hypochlorite) towelettes on 
exterior surfaces 
 
2. Use of Hype-Wipe (0.94% - 5.25% sodium hypochlorite) towelettes on 
exterior and reachable surfaces 
 
3. Use of soaked paper towel (1.05% sodium hypochlorite)  
4. Sodium hypochlorite (1.05%) mist for 20 minutes 
5. Placing the BAWS in a biohazard bag with 5.25% sodium hypochlorite and 
expose to sunlight for 1 hour. 
 
6. Placing the BAWS in a biohazard bag with 2.125% sodium hypochlorite and 
phosphoric acid to generate chlorine gas. 
 
The tests with the Hype Wipe towelette show that it was an effective 
decontaminant for the majority of surfaces to which it was applied, with no B. globigii 
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spores recovered.  Still several areas, such as the glass tube assembly, exhaust hose, left 
panel and cooling grate all had residual spores, sometimes as many as 51 10× CFU present 
on a surface following decontamination (Simmons, Hanson, & Seerup, 2008).  The 
bleach soaked paper towels demonstrated minimal efficacy with multiple order of 
magnitude decreases in bacterial counts apparent on only a few components.  
Considering the conceptual similarity between the Hype Wipe and a paper towel soaked 
in a bleach solution this result appears counterintuitive.  Several surfaces demonstrated 
no reductions at all.  Similar effects on the biological loads were observed using the 
hypochlorite mist and incubation in a biohazard bag followed by an hour of sunlight.  In 
fact, the latter induced such severe corrosion as to render the device inoperable 
(Simmons, Hanson, & Seerup, 2008).  Ultimately the chlorine gas test was the most 
effective method of sterilizing the device; however, this method also caused severe 
corrosion (Simmons, Hanson, & Seerup, 2008). 
A subsequent study on BAWS Mk. IV decontamination was conducted at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratories.  The MIT-LL study 
examined the decontamination of just the BAWS Mk. IV as well.  The criteria for 
selection were as follows: 
1. Demonstrates sporocidal activity 
2. Must not be corrosive to sensor components 
3. Must not interfere with sensor operations (Tremblay, 2008) 
Multiple chemical agents with various antimicrobial mechanisms as well as 
physical methods were compared and ranked based on the aforementioned criteria.  
Sodium hypochlorite scored highly for its oxidizing properties and efficacy against 
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spores, but received the lowest overall rank for its extremely corrosive properties, as 
underscored in the previous study.  Still it was retested as a comparison for potentially 
less corrosive biocides. 
In the coupon-testing portion of the investigation, individual sensor components 
were tested against formaldehyde (37%), hydrogen peroxide (35%) and sodium 
hypochlorite (10%).  Sodium hypochlorite met acceptability standards for sporocidal 
activity but failed the standards for non-corrosivity.  Only conformally-coated electronics 
were resistant to corrosion caused by hypochlorite (Tremblay, 2008).  
Summary 
CRAs, most notably hypochlorite compounds, have long been recognized as 
potent bactericidal and sporocidal agents.  Hypochlorites, however, have several 
limitations to their use the most notable here being its corrosive properties when applied 
to delicate optics, sensors and electronics.  Another factor in microbicidal efficacy is the 
pH of the hypochlorite solution.  The XMX lacks such a complicated apparatus and runs 
a reduced risk of chlorine induced corrosion on the components of interest. 
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III. Methodology 
XMX Sample Surfaces 
Three XMX/2L-MILs were selected for evaluation, designated Unit 1, 2 and 3 
respectively.  Each inner canister was dismantled into components labeled A-E 
respectively (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Components of the XMX/2L-MIL inlet stack. A - Primary inlet, B - Primary nozzle plate, 
C- upper canister, D - lower canister and E - final nozzle. 
 
 
Biological Agent Surrogates 
Bacillus atrophaeus (formerly Bacillus globigii and Bacillus subtilis var. niger) 
spores were provided by the Life Sciences Division, West Desert Test Center, Dugway 
Proving Grounds, Utah.  B. atrophaeus is commonly used instead of B. anthracis in 
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microbicidal testing (Baird, 2004).  Erwinia herbicola, also referred to as Panotea 
agglomerans, is a gram negative organism in the family Enterobacteracieae, used to 
simulate Yersinia pestis, the agent responsible for bubonic/pneumonic plague. 
Aerosol Test Chamber 
The aerosol test chamber (ATC) utilized was provided by Dycor Technologies 
Ltd (Figure 4).  It has a volume of twelve cubic meters and has three ports to allow 
testing of up to three XMX devices simultaneously.  Additionally the chamber has the 
capacity to connect two slit-to-agar devices. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Aerosol Test Chamber Setup - 2009-04 XMX Decontamination Test 
 
 
XMX Preparation/Testing Regimen 
XMX components were sterilized between decontamination tests in a 10% bleach 
solution.  Components were allowed to soak for 5 minutes, were placed in a water bath 
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and then dried in a drying oven.  To ensure consistency throughout each test each 
component was labeled with permanent marker.  To establish a baseline level of 
microbial contamination prior to exposure, predetermined areas of interest were sampled 
with sterile swabs moistened with ultrapure water.  The swabs were subsequently plated 
on tryptic soy agar (TSA) provided by Dalynn Biological supply and incubated overnight 
at 37°C.  After reassembly the test XMX devices were connected to the ATC and a 5-min 
air purge was run to allow for the measurement of the background level of microbial 
contamination within the ATC.  After the purge, a second background measurement was 
taken and the XMXs were again disassembled and swabbed according to standard 
procedure.  The swab tips were collected in Fisherbrand 50 mL centrifuge vials 
containing sterile water for culture / serial dilutions.  During the E. herbicola exposures, 
Phosphate Buffered Saline (PBS) was used as an alternative because the organism does 
not survive well in water.  The test matrix in Table 1 provides a brief description of each 
of the samples collected throughout the investigation.  
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Table 1. Test Matrix 
 
 
 
Exposure 
XMX inlet stacks were first inserted into the ATC, followed by the XMX base 
containing the five inner canister components.  Two New Brunswick Scientific 
Biological Air Samplers (STA-203) were connected to the chamber as a means of 
determining the total concentration of agent in the chamber during the exposure period.  
Each STA sampled at a rate of 30 L/min collecting the organisms onto TSA plates.  Each 
plate was able to collect samples for 2 minutes, requiring replacement with another plate 
Sample Subsample Description
1 Background: Initial sterilization for baseline
2 Background: Baseline contamination in ATC
a Agent exposure, B. atrophaeus
b Post-decon (10% bleach wipedown)
c 5- min air purge
d 10- min air purge
e 15- min air purge
4 Background: sterilization for baseline
5 Background: Baseline contamination in ATC
a Agent exposure, B. atrophaeus
b Post-decon (10% bleach wipedown)
c 15- min air purge
7 Background: sterilization for baseline
8 Background: Baseline contamination in ATC
a Agent exposure, B. atrophaeus
b Post-decon (10% bleach submersion)
c 15- min air purge
10 Background: sterilization for baseline
11 Background: Baseline contamination in ATC
a Agent exposure, P. agglomerans
b Post-decon (10% bleach submersion)
c 15- min air purge
3
6
9
12
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at the 2-minute mark.  B. atrophaeus was maintained on a rocker platform (ZD-9550) 
prior to its introduction into the ATC to prevent the spores from forming agglomerates. B. 
atrophaeus spores were introduced into the chamber via a Sono-Tek Sprayer and an 
attached Aerodynamic Particle Sizer (TSI-3320) was used to monitor particle 
dimensions.  The three XMX devices sampled continuously for 5 minutes to stimulate 
use in a biologically contaminated environment.  Subsequent to each exposure run the 
impingement nozzle was replaced to prevent any contamination during the air purges. 
Decontamination 
Two methods of decontaminating critical XMX components were attempted; the 
first was the previously-studied wipe-down method to validate its effectiveness.  The 
second method investigated involved submerging the components in a bleach solution for 
a short duration.  A solution of commercially available bleach (Javex 5 bleach, 5.25% 
(w/v) sodium hypochlorite) was prepared at a concentration of 10% by combining one 
liter of bleach with nine liters of water. 
Wipe-down regimen 
Following the exposure sampling the XMX was removed from the ATC and the 
inner canister removed and dismantled into components A – E.  Each component was 
manually wiped on all surfaces with paper towels (Scott© Shop Towels) soaked in a 
solution of 10% bleach.  The previously determined areas of interest on each component 
were then swabbed with a 10% bleach solution.  Following the decontamination 
procedure the components were wiped down with a damp paper towel to remove any 
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residual bleach and inhibit corrosion.  Each component was swabbed once after drying 
with a paper towel. 
Submersion regimen 
As with the manual wipe-down method, the XMXs were removed from the ATC, 
disassembled and the appropriate components swabbed.  Each component was then 
placed in a 5 gallon bucket containing a 10% bleach solution prepared from 1 L Javex, 
9L water. After each of the five components was completely submerged in the solution a 
5-minute timer was started.  Upon completion, each component was then removed and 
placed in a bucket containing tap water for an additional 5 minutes.  The components 
were then manually dried using paper towels and swabbed as previously described. 
Quantification of Microbial Contamination 
To determine the precise amount of bacterial contamination on each sampled 
surface, serial dilutions were performed on the samples taken from the swabbed 
components.  The 50 mL collection tubes were vortexed to minimize any agglomeration 
of sample particles (i.e. spores or vegetative cells) and 1 mL was pipetted into 9 mL of 
sterile water creating a 1:10 dilution.  This process was repeated to create 1:100 and 
1:1000 dilutions when deemed necessary.  Each dilution, including an undiluted sample, 
was plated twice.  Aseptic technique was maintained throughout the experiment. 
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Figure 5. Serial dilution procedure 
 
 
Analysis 
 Microbial counts in colony forming units per milliliter (CFU/mL) were recorded 
and then the average between each plate count was calculated.  These values were then 
scaled according to their dilution factor, i.e. a 1/100 dilution would be multiplied by 100 
to obtain the true number of colonies.  These values were then normalized to 2500 liters 
of air per 5 minutes.  From these normalized values, the contamination on each XMX 
component (A-E) for all three test units were summed to yield total contamination values 
for each subsample.  These values were plotted on a log scale.  Differences in mean 
bacterial counts in CFU/ml following application of the decontamination procedure and 
the air purge were examined using single-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
Significance of differences was placed at P < 0.05 (5%).
1 mL swab sample
9 mL sterile H2O
1/10 1/100 1/1000
1 mL
9 mL
1 mL
9 mL
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IV. Results/Discussion 
 The application of a sodium hypochlorite solution to contaminated XMX surfaces 
by moistened paper towels showed considerable variation in its ability to reduce 
microbial contamination to background levels or below.  In Figure 6, microbial 
contamination actually increased in one test after the decontamination procedure had 
been applied.  Combined with the 30-minute air purge, however, contamination was 
reduced to near-background levels. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. B. atrophaeus concentrations collected with the XMX/2L-MIL prior to exposure, during 
exposure, post decontamination by bleach wipedown and throughout an aggregate 30 minutes of air 
purge. 
 
 
Also of note is that Unit 1 collected a bacterial load two orders of magnitude 
higher that the remaining devices.  A possible explanation might be the air flow patterns 
within the test chamber itself, which may cause one device to “see” more of the bacterial 
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aerosol than the other devices.  Dycor had previously examined how ACPLA (agent-
containing particles per liter of air) differs between the ports in their aerosol test chamber.  
As the concentration of suspended B. atrophaeus spores increased, one of the ports 
tended to collect more spores than the other (see Appendix 1).  This might explain why 
the contamination for XMX Unit 1 was so large when compared to the other two.  It is 
important to note however, that the previous investigation by Dycor utilized a differing 
spraying device (a Hudson nebulizer versus a Sono-Tek sprayer) and a different sprayer 
position than the XMX decontamination setup.  A comparison of the two chamber 
configurations can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. B. atrophaeus concentrations collected with the XMX/2L-MIL prior to exposure, during 
exposure, post decontamination by bleach wipedown and throughout 15-minutes of air purge. 
 
 
Subsequent trials, however, did not demonstrate such disparate data. As shown in 
Figures 7 and 8, the contamination levels were generally consistent among all three 
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devices.  While the wipedown procedure combined with only a 15-minutes air purge is 
capable of reducing bacterial contamination, the levels present are not comparable to 
background contamination.  Figure 6 shows microbial growth in the post-
decontamination condition, potentially indicating that bleach itself is not entirely 
effective or that preparation of the solution was inadequate.  It may also suggest an error 
in technique such as an inconsistency between how thoroughly specimens were 
decontaminated and how thoroughly they were swabbed, or that a longer air purge is 
helpful. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. B. atrophaeus concentrations collected with the XMX/2L-MIL prior to exposure, during 
exposure, post decontamination by bleach submersion and throughout 15-minutes of air purge. 
 
 
 The bleach wipedown regimen initially appears to be somewhat more efficient 
than the wipe down procedure.  It reduced microbial contamination on XMX surfaces by 
approximately two orders of magnitude, with final bacterial counts at or below 
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background levels.  This stands in stark contrast with the previous trial.  Eliminating the 
human element and simply exposing all surfaces to the chlorine solution equally may be 
one of the factors explaining the apparent increase in effectiveness.  The extended contact 
time (5 minutes) for the bleach submersion procedure may also be a factor.  Though the 
wipedown method was not timed, no more than 2 minutes were spent decontaminating 
any individual component. 
 Single-factor ANOVA revealed no significant difference (p = 0.09) between the 
two proposed decontamination methods (including air purge) in reducing microbial 
populations (Figure 9).  With this outcome it cannot be concluded that one method results 
in a lower mean bacterial count that the others. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Influence of decontamination procedure on microbial contamination of the XMX inlet 
stack. 
 
 
 A limitation of the current investigation is reproducibility.  Relatively few 
samples were run which can hinder arriving at a reasonable conclusion.  With more trials 
ANOVA: Single Factor
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Decon by 10% bleach wipedown + 30 min air purge 3 0.6 0.2 0.014439
Decon by 10% bleach wipedown + 15 min air purge 3 15.3334 5.111133 15.50921
Decon by 10% bleach submersion + 15 min air purge 3 4.5001 1.500033 0.333333
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 38.84936 2 19.42468 3.674976 0.090785 5.143253
Within Groups 31.71397 6 5.285662
Total 70.56333 8
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it may have been easier to determine if there is indeed a bias in the ATC or if some other 
indeterminate error was to blame.  Furthermore, limitations on the efficiency of spore 
recovery by swabbing have been identified.  Many factors contribute to spore recovery, 
including the initial seed of bacteria, the surface being sampled and the swab itself.  
Cotton swabs sampling on steel surface with liquid-deposited B. atrophaeus spores had a 
recovery efficiency of only 47% (SD = 9.3) (Edmonds, Collett, Valdes, Skowronski, 
Pellar, & Emanuel, 2009).  When water is eliminated from the spores deposited on a 
surface, they tend to aggregate and can be drawn into miniscule crevices in the material, 
rendering them effectively lost to most sampling techniques (Edmonds, Collett, Valdes, 
Skowronski, Pellar, & Emanuel, 2009).  It is possible that data was lost during this 
investigation due to the inherent difficulties in sampling spores. 
 Another factor which may have affected the results is the alkalinity of the bleach 
solution used during the investigation.  The Material Safety Data Sheet for Javex 5 bleach 
lists the pH as 12.5-13 (Clorox, 2009).  As previously mentioned, pH affects the 
antimicrobial activity of sodium hypochlorite.  The literature search indicated that neutral 
bleach is preferable due to the fact hypochlorite exists preferentially as hypochlorous acid 
and not as hypochlorite ion.  Recall that HOCl H OCl+ −+€ .  This fact may account for 
some of the shortcomings in bleach disinfection noted earlier.  Addition of vinegar, a 
substance which would likely be present in deployed as well as domestic environments, 
will reduce the pH and should subsequently increase antimicrobial action (Sliwa, 2006).  
Acidifying the solution may also decrease its stability, necessitating that bleach solutions 
be prepared fresh and not stored for long periods so as to retain their killing power.  
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Testing for available chlorine, a task well within BE capabilities, should prove helpful in 
maintaining the solution’s disinfecting properties. 
 Perhaps one of the most significant limitations was the method used to arrive at 
the baseline contamination values, the bleach bath.  By using this procedure, the tests 
were essentially comparing the efficacy of bleach to itself.  A superior method of 
determining baselines would be a non-chemical method, such as autoclaving, which has 
documented sporocidal effects.  Studies have demonstrated that autoclaving can 
successfully reduce spore contamination by at least 4-logs (Lemieux, Sieber, Osborne, & 
Woodard, 2006).  The authors reported that two standard cycles of 40 minutes at 31.5 
lb/in2 and 275° F (135° C) were effective in decontaminating building materials 
(Lemieux, Sieber, Osborne, & Woodard, 2006).   
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions of Research 
In this investigation two field-expedient methods of decontaminating the 
XMX/2L-MIL were tested: soaking a paper towel in 10% bleach and wiping down 
available surfaces and submerging the parts entirely in the solution with a five minute 
contact time.  Hypochlorite is confirmed to be bactericidal and sporocidal at 
concentrations as low as 0.05%.  During the study, it was observed that 10% bleach 
solutions resulted in approximately 102-fold decreases in aggregate microbial 
contamination on XMX components.  Of the methods tested, the submersion regimen in 
conjunction with a 15-minute air purge showed the most efficiency.  Contamination 
levels were consistent between all three devices and were measured at or below 
background levels after decontamination.   
However, in certain aspects bleach disinfection did not appear to match the results 
reported in the literature.  Though a 102-fold decrease represents a 99% kill probability, 
upwards of five orders of magnitude reductions are commonly reported in disinfection 
studies (Sagripanti, Carrera, Insalaco, Ziemski, Rogers, & Zandomeni, 2006) (Sagripanti 
& Bonifacino, 1996).  The results obtained in the trials for 10% bleach wipedowns also 
showed peculiar trends, such as increases in microbial contamination after applying the 
bleach solution as well as failure to reach baseline levels.  Such outcomes are can likely 
explained as artifacts from errors in procedure or the inadequate pH level of the bleach 
solution, rather than any weakness in bleach’s ability to inactivate microorganisms.  
Though the differences in overall decontamination efficacy between the methods did not 
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reach statistical significance at 95% confidence, the author feels that certain 
recommendations may still be made. 
Recommendations for Action 
At this juncture, the bleach submersion procedure represents a simple and rapid 
method of decontaminating the XMX/2L-MIL after sampling a biological incident.  The 
materials are readily available in both home-station or deployed environments, and the 
procedure requires minimal instruction to apprehend and properly execute.  It eliminates 
much of the potential for human error which was present in the wipe down procedure and 
gives around two orders of magnitude reduction in the microbial population on the 
device.  Furthermore, lowering the pH using vinegar is strongly recommended; it 
represents a simple, non-toxic method for increasing bleach’s ability to sterilize surfaces 
with significant support from scientific literature. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
While a 10% bleach solution fits many of the criteria for an ideal decontaminating 
agent (inexpensive, easy to use, relative non-toxicity, broad antimicrobial effect etc.), 
what this investigation does not address is, how clean is safe?  A clear metric for deciding 
what qualifies as “officially” decontaminated was not reached before the commencement 
of this project.  Contamination levels were reduced to near background levels, but as 
previously mentioned, this baseline was determined arbitrarily using one of the methods 
undergoing evaluation.  Further study should combine this decontamination procedure 
with the method of detection and identification currently used by the Air Force and its 
 43 
 
sister services, the Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System 
(JBAIDS).  Doing so embraces the “Garrison equals Deployed” concept employed by the 
BE career field.  Recall that the Eglin trials studied the XMX as part of the CBAWS 
alongside the BAWS Mk. III and the Rugged Advanced Pathogen Identification Device 
(RAPID) system, the predecessor to JBAIDS.  The samples collected by the XMX/2L-
MIL are suitable for analysis using the JBAIDS which is able to more reliably identify 
several biological weapon agents simultaneously than RAPID (Idaho Technology Inc., 
2001-2009).  Ideally, after decontaminating an XMX unit using the protocol 
recommended above, analysis using the JBAIDS would come back negative.  It is 
entirely possible, however, that the JBAIDS process is sensitive enough to detect the 
level of residual contamination on the XMX that were characterized as “background.”  If 
future studies are undertaken, a set amount of microbial reduction should be 
predetermined with the results compared to that mark. 
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Appendix 1 – Supplemental Data 
 
Figure 10. Chamber Setup - 2008-07-22 Port Comparison Setup 
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Table 2. Port comparison trial, static cloud with 100 ACPLA load 
  
ACPLA 
Setpoint Trial # Slit 1 Slit 2 Slit 3 Slit 4 
100 
1 80.9 69.5 69.5 71.9 
2 90.3 80.9 81.5 84.9 
3 77.8 68.1 66.9 70.9 
4 94.6 86.5 82.0 84.8 
5 77.4 62.2 67.2 63.2 
 
Average 84.2 73.4 73.4 75.1 
 
Minimum 73.4 
 
Maximum 84.2 
 
Range 10.8 
 
% diff. 12.8 
 
 
      
Table 3. Port comparison trial, static cloud with 200 ACPLA load 
  
ACPLA 
Setpoint Trial # Slit 1 Slit 2 Slit 3 Slit 4 
200 
6 122.3 101.0 103.4 115.5 
7 114.4 106.4 104.6 125.8 
8 105.3 101.6 103.1 120.6 
9 110.0 97.0 87.0 103.8 
10 109.2 99.6 100.9 111.9 
 
Average 112.2 101.1 99.8 115.5 
 
Minimum 99.8 
 
Maximum 115.5 
 
Range 15.7 
 
% diff. 13.6 
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Table 4. Port comparison trial, static cloud with 300 ACPLA load 
  
ACPLA 
Setpoint Trial # Slit 1 Slit 2 Slit 3 Slit 4 
300 
11 122.0 110.9 114.5 133.8 
12 140.6 123.2 114.0 119.7 
13 138.1 124.0 120.1 141.8 
14 143.8 129.3 113.7 144.4 
15 131.6 124.0 121.3 131.1 
 
Average 135.2 122.3 116.7 134.2 
 
Minimum 116.7 
 
Maximum 135.2 
 
Range 18.5 
 
% diff. 13.7 
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Appendix 2 – Raw Data 
Table 5. Raw counts of microbial contamination during B.g. trials 
The following samples were collected using Bacillus atrophaeus (Bg) 
Background 01 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3               
A 0 0 0               
B 1 0 0               
C 0 0 0               
D 0 0 0               
E 0 0 0               
                      
Sample 3A CT (raw) Unit 1a Unit 1b Unit 2a Unit 2b Unit 3a Unit 3b         
d0 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC         
d1 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC         
d2 13 25 26 22 21 26         
d3 2 3 2 2 0 3         
                      
Sample 3A (raw)                     
Unit 1 Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
d0 2 2 13 9 10 14 9 13 1 2 
d1 1 0 1 1 1 4 2 0 0 0 
d2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
                      
           Sample 3A (raw)                     
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Unit 2 Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
d0 3 2 14 21 0 0 1 0 0 0 
d1 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                      
Sample 3A (raw)                     
Unit 3 Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
d0 2 1 24 27 5 2 4 2 5 5 
d1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                      
Sample 3B (raw) Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
Unit 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unit 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unit 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 38 0 0 
                      
Sample 3C (raw) Unit 1a Unit 1b Unit 2a Unit 2b Unit 3a Unit 3b         
Collection tube 0 0 0 0 4 6         
                      
Sample 3C (raw) Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
Unit 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unit 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unit 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 
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Sample 3D (raw) Unit 1a Unit 1b Unit 2a Unit 2b Unit 3a Unit 3b         
Collection tube 0 0 1 2 5 4         
                      
Sample 3D (raw) Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
Unit 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Unit 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unit 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 
                      
Sample 3E (raw) Unit 1a Unit 1b Unit 2a Unit 2b Unit 3a Unit 3b         
Collection tube 0 0 1 2 5 4         
                      
Sample 3E (raw) Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
Unit 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unit 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unit 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
                      
Background 4 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3               
A 0 0 0               
B 1 0 0               
C 0 0 0               
D 0 0 0               
E 0 0 0               
                      
Background 5 (raw) Unit 1a Unit 1b Unit 2a Unit 2b Unit 3a Unit 3b         
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Collection tube 1 0 0 1 2 1         
                      
Background 5 (raw) Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
Unit 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 
Unit 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unit 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                      
Sample 6A CT (raw)  Unit 1a Unit 1b Unit 2a Unit 2b Unit 3a Unit 3b         
d0 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC         
d1 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC         
d2 TNTC  TNTC  TNTC  TNTC  TNTC  TNTC          
d3 21 13 18 28 22 36         
                      
Sample 6A (raw)                     
Unit 1 Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
d0 13 3 194 157 21 30 73 91 19 24 
d1 3 0 10 12 2 4 2 6 1 1 
                      
Sample 6A (raw)                     
Unit 2 Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
d0 1 0 155 162 8 3 61 67 6 5 
d1 0 1 13 16 1 0 2 5 1 0 
                      
           Sample 6A (raw)                     
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Unit 3 Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
d0 10 9 171 151 29 26 14 28 31 32 
d1 1 1 7 4 0 2 1 2 3 2 
                      
Sample 6B (raw) Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
Unit 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unit 2 4 1 0 0 4 3 1 1 4 2 
Unit 3 5 5 4 2 4 3 1 0 4 0 
                      
Sample 6C CT (raw)  Unit 1a Unit 1b Unit 2a Unit 2b Unit 3a Unit 3b         
d0 6 4 * * 16 11         
d1 1 1 * * 1 0         
                      
Sample 6C (raw) Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
Unit 1 2 10 4 4 2 4 5 2 4 2 
Unit 2 8 0 5 2 6 0 6 6 5 2 
Unit 3 2 2 5 7 5 4 8 4 6 6 
                      
Background 7 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3               
A 0 0 0               
B 0 0 0               
C 0 0 0               
D 0 0 1               
E 0 0 0               
Background 8 CT (raw)  Unit 1a Unit 1b Unit 2a Unit 2b Unit 3a Unit 3b         
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d0 1 0 0 0 1 1         
                      
Background 8 CT (raw)  Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
Unit 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Unit 2 0 0 1 0 3 1 1 1 0 0 
Unit 3 1 0 8 1 0 0 1 0 7 1 
                      
Sample 9A CT (raw)  Unit 1a Unit 1b Unit 2a Unit 2b Unit 3a Unit 3b         
d0 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC         
d1 TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC TNTC         
d2 81 92 114 94 105 133         
d3 6 6 11 7 8 3         
                      
Sample 9A (raw)                     
Unit 1 Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
d0 4 2 130 120 70 63 43 52 4 9 
d1 1 0 7 12 10 6 3 5 2 0 
                      
Sample 9A (raw)                     
Unit 2 Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
d0 4 2 252 226 6 9 25 28 14 9 
d1 0 0 19 22 0 0 2 2 3 1 
  
                     
Sample 9A (raw)                     
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Unit 3 Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
d0 2 2 190 140 22 18 8 6 10 12 
d1 1 0 17 15 2 2 0 0 0 0 
                      
Sample 9B (raw) Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
Unit 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Unit 2 2 0 1 0 0 1 3 0 2 0 
Unit 3 2 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 
                      
Sample 9C CT (raw)  Unit 1a Unit 1b Unit 2a Unit 2b Unit 3a Unit 3b         
d0 5 6 * * 5 8         
                      
Sample 9C (raw) Aa Ab Ba Bb Ca Cb Da Db Ea Eb 
Unit 1 0 0 2 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 
Unit 2 6 0 2 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 
Unit 3 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 
           *indicates evaporation of the sample medium 
TNTC = too numerous to count 
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14-Apr-09
Nomenclature
d0 No dilution
d1 1/10 dilution
d2 1/100 dilution
d3 1/1000 dilution
a First split sample
b Second split sample Label Part
σ Standard deviation A
B
CT Collection tube C
D
E
Inner stack
Nozzle plate
Upper canister
Lower canister
Final nozzle
Sample A: post-exposure
Sample B: post-decon
Sample C: post-decon + 5 min
Sample D: post-decon + 10 min
Sample E: post-decon + 15 min
 
Figure 11. Nomenclature describing the raw data table 
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